leadership

leadership

  • Call for Applications Cultural Diplomacy in Africa - A Forum for Young Leaders

    Africa and the Global Economy: Creating Opportunities and Development Strategies Africa’s progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The program for the Seminar is split into two parts, beginning with group workshops, seminars, and lectures from 17th – 20th January. These components will be followed by an international conference on development in Africa from 21st – 23rd January. In addition to looking in greater detail at the history and development of cultural diplomacy, the next CDA Weeklong Seminar will focus on the issues of development and economic growth on the African continent. In particular, it will focus on the following areas: The role of public-private-partnerships in supporting development within Africa, with a focus on the “Energy-Poverty-Action” initiative. The role played by "economic bridges" in ensuring national and regional stability and the role young leaders can play in supporting these bridges. New strategies for progress in healthcare, education, and water management. The involvement of international partners in African development projects and the African economy. The Rise of Africa: An International Conference on New Strategies and Approaches to Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa (21st – 23rd January) will take place as an integral part of the Weeklong Seminar, and will bring together expert speakers from the fields of politics, academia, and civil society for a 3 day program of lectures and panel discussions. Once individuals have taken part in the Weeklong Seminar they will join the CDA Forum, a network of likeminded individuals from Africa and across the world who conduct activity to improve intercultural relations within Africa and between Africa and other regions. Who can apply? The CDA Weeklong Seminar is open to applications from students and young professionals with an active interest in the African continent and international affairs. What will the Weeklong Seminar involve? The program for the Weeklong Seminar will consist of lectures, seminars, workshops, and cultural activities in and around Berlin. The participants will meet with leading figures from the fields of economics, politics, academia and civil society to discuss the role of economic interdependence and cultural exchange in strengthening and supporting relations within African and between Africa and other regions. Speakers at previous Weeklong Seminars included representatives from the German Federal Foreign Office, the German Parliament, the European Commission, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), KfW Development Bank, and the Embassies of Lesotho, Tanzania, Rwanda, Egypt, Mozambique and Malawi in Berlin. What are the aims of the Weeklong Seminar? The Seminars aim to prepare the participants for the development of their own activity that will strengthen intercultural relations within African and between Africa and other regions. The program will also aim to raise awareness amongst the group of salient issues relating to politics, development, and the economy within African. What happens after the Seminar? After completing the Weeklong Seminars the participants become members of the CDA Forum. They are then supported by the ICD in conducting research, in organising and developing leadership initiatives, and are invited to join the ICD Online Forum where they can network with the other Young Leaders from around the world. More information about the Seminar, including brochures, timetables, and the online application forms, can be found under: www.culturaldiplomacy.org/cda For questions relating to the Weeklong Seminar, please contact us under cda@culturaldiplomacy.org
  • Organisational Development and the NPO leader: Part 4 - Programme Implementation

    From the process we have explored so far in the first three parts of this article series, you should have an idea of what organisational development (OD) is, what its purpose and principles are, the process of OD diagnosis, and the key points of choosing and planning an intervention. However, many OD programmes do not fail in these earlier stages, but rather in the actual implementation of the programme and its interventions. Common causes of failure include the inability to maintain stakeholder support, loss of interest by the leadership team because of other ‘crises’, losing perspective of interventions versus programmes (interventions are prioritised over the overall process, eg training is no longer a tool in the process but becomes the goal), poorly managed consultants, and leaders who hijack the process.

    Gaining support and commitment

    One of the most important ideas to consider is that OD is something we should ideally do with others, not to them. If we bring a sense of superiority to the OD process, we are going to alienate others. Communication, participation, involvement, feedback and empowerment are vital in gaining support and commitment. By making others part of the process, we help them to own the outcomes. It is not uncommon to hear employees refer to a particular OD programme as the ‘leader’s’ - “The restructuring of the teams is Joe’s project, he doesn’t tell us anything”. This can even happen between a managing director and the board. The more the leader hoards the project, the less others engage and express what they really think and feel.

    Remember that OD has a systemic focus, which means we are trying to change large parts or the whole organisation. OD often wholly or partly targets social systems and patterns of behaviour. Hence, if we do not engage and involve others in the OD programme, they will not go through the process of changing their mind and their behaviour and the ultimate goal of the OD programme will not be achieved. Objectivity and some distance from an OD process is one of the advantages of having an external facilitator or consultant, but a leader who knows how to maintain objectivity and become a facilitator of the process can usually make a good OD programme leader too. The trick here is to see OD as a people process to be facilitated and not a series of objectives to be completed.

    Ensuring a positive approach

    One of the most innovative and interesting developments in OD in the last 25 years has been the Appreciative Enquiry (usually abbreviated as AI because of the American version Appreciative Inquiry) approach. As opposed to the more common approach to OD which follows a typical problem-solving cycle of looking for problems, looking for solutions and implementing them, the AI approach rather says: “Let’s look for examples of success and where things are working well in the organisation and then we can study those examples and see how we can spread that success more broadly”. The advantages of the home-grown nature of solutions and positive-psychology approach of AI are obvious. Keeping things positive is much more beneficial than problem-driven OD processes that make people feel insecure in their jobs, have the tone of a witch-hunt, or that fail to celebrate success and acknowledge the good in people and the past. You do not need to adopt the AI approach, but any OD process needs to balance its focus on results with an encouraging, appreciative approach.

    Clarify goals of the OD process


    Employees and stakeholders need to know, at the onset of implementing an OD process, what the objectives of the OD programmes are and how these goals will be achieved. Honesty and transparency about the programme are vital in minimising suspicion, anxiety and resistance. People cope better with change if it is not unexpected and confusing, and it helps if they know what their roles might be and what may be expected of them during the OD process. Uncertainty and a sense of being out of control are exaggerated when there is a lack of clarity and information – this is what makes the difference between doing things with people versus doing things to people.

    Communication is key

    You cannot communicate enough in OD. If you want to make an OD process work, you need real, two-way communication on an ongoing basis. Really listening to your staff and asking questions so that you can understand where they are coming from and how they see a situation is just as important as giving a great presentation to staff at the beginning of a new OD programme. For example, after an opening presentation to your staff, do not just wrap up the presentation with the standard “Any questions?” Rather break them into small groups and ask them to discuss aspects of the programme, such as the need for the programme, the choice of interventions, and concerns or suggestions they have. Small groups may encourage staff to open up, see that others have questions and concerns too, and help them process the information better. Communication and OD are not events, they are processes. It is good practice to have follow-ups a few days later to discuss more detail, or address questions and concerns that may arise over time. Further updates on the progress and discussion sessions will be needed throughout the programme. In addition, you may consider having anonymous surveys, focus groups or interviews facilitated by a neutral third party or a questions box that allow people to express themselves anonymously.

    Communicate on progress

    Review your progress on the OD programme regularly and update your staff on this progress too. Be honest and open and celebrate milestones often. A post-intervention and programme review is also a good idea to ensure learning from interventions/programmes, to measure success, and to identify ways to continually reinforce the new outcomes of the programme. Do not forget to provide your board and other stakeholders with regular feedback. Funders who have a vested long-term interest in your NPOs success will be more likely to assist with funding for a particular OD project (eg upskilling, leadership development) if you give them regular feedback on how the interventions are resulting in greater organisational effectiveness.

    Ensure ownership of the OD process

    If the OD programme is purely the brainchild of an external consultant or wholly under the control of a consultant, the OD process will not result in expanded ownership for your organisation and a truly developmental experience for you and other staff and stakeholders. A good consultant will manage their own involvement to allow for ownership by the organisation, by taking the role of facilitator rather than ‘boss’. Furthermore, if the programme is in the organisation’s control, then any consultant who is not making the grade can be replaced without derailing the entire programme. Ownership by the organisation will ensure a sustained change.

    This article series on OD has attempted to get you thinking about your organisation’s needs and possible development areas that might necessitate an OD programme. OD programmes are not just for failing organisations, but are critical to all organisations in order to be revived, redirected, and developed on an ongoing basis to survive and thrive. Remember that the goal is organisational effectiveness, which is an elusive and can-always-be-better ambition.

    - Dr Stuart Allen works at the Nyack College, SBL.
    Author(s): 
    Stuart Allen
  • Organisational Development and the NPO leader- Part 3: Planning OD Interventions

    Planning organisational development (OD) interventions has two key aspects: intervention choice and planning for the execution of the intervention. OD interventions fail for many reasons, but common ones include bad choice of intervention or poor implementation. The choice of intervention should, as the previous articles in this series have emphasised, be guided by the initial diagnosis. If you know what is wrong, then you can choose a suitable remedy. Starting with the choice of remedy makes little sense. Equally, do not always expect there to be one thing wrong. Organisations, like people, are complex and tend to have a mix of issues, some related and others not. For example, an organisation that has unhappy employees often has other issues, because employees sometimes focus on their salaries more than they normally would when there are problems with things like job satisfaction, leadership, meaningful work, or other factors. So you might have to deal with problems in a few areas, before the unhappiness alleviates.

    Remember that OD interventions typically address problems that are long-term in nature: a dishonest manager who needs to be terminated is not an OD issue, unless the organisation has a tendency toward poor hiring practice or broad ethical issues. With problems that are complex and have taken a while to develop, the solution usually takes a while to implement. For example, even an NPO that was caught off guard by sudden withdrawal of a funder needs to consider that while there is a short-term solution (find another funder), there is probably a need for a long-term and more complex solution in terms of creating a greater strategic focus on funding (to prevent future crises), improving fundraising skills in the organisation, and better strategic planning by the leadership. There are a few exceptions with OD that can or must be quickly implemented, but this is usually limited to situations where rapid change is needed for survival, such as restructuring of organisations.

    In addition to needing to focus on the long-term in OD, leaders also need to remember that OD is usually programmatic. This simply means that OD does not usually refer to a single intervention, but rather a series of interventions over time. The term ‘programme ‘serves as an umbrella for a number of interventions over years that collectively aim to resolve an organisation’s problem/s or strengthen the organisation. It is useful to see OD as a programme because it needs to be managed as such – it usually needs a champion (leader) or task team who will oversee the process to ensure it does not get dropped, sidelined or neglected, and that it is progressing and achieving its aims. For example, an OD programme designed to reduce silos between departments or teams is usually a multipart intervention over a few months or years that requires the involvement and support of the whole management team and ultimately the whole organisation. Some organisations even choose to brand their OD programmes, so that employees can see something new and special is happening. This also helps to maintain accountability, encapsulate changes and interventions under a single brand, and can enhance the therapeutic value of the interventions.

    It is also valuable to mention that there are different levels of intervention. Interventions can take place at the individual, dyadic (pair of individuals), team/departmental, interdepartmental, organisational, inter-organisational, or even industry level. The choice of level is again determined by the diagnosis. OD programmes often include multi-level interventions. For example, an NPO wanting to reduce bureaucracy may introduce a series of bureaucracy-bashing interventions:

    a) at the individual level (employees requested to report back by a specific date on how they could reduce the complexity and paperwork required in their jobs);

    b) at the interdepartmental level (workshops to discuss how procedures can be dovetailed and duplication of work across departments can be reduced);

    c) at the organisational level (strategic planning sessions within leadership to identify ways to instil new priorities, measures and values away from the bureaucratic focus that developed); and

    d) at the and inter-organisational level (workshops with funders and government departments to discuss reporting and paperwork requirements with a focus on rationalising documentation while still meeting requirements).

    Part of planning any intervention also needs to consider the management of the intervention. This would include managing the change (people-focused) and project-managing the interventions (task focused). Project managing the interventions looks largely at breaking down interventions into their component parts, setting dates, setting responsibilities, identifying resources and creating mechanisms for monitoring progress. Change management would look at how to ensure the intervention is well-received by staff and might include communication of the why, what, who, how and when of interventions, creating opportunities for feedback, consultation and two-way communication before, during and after interventions, as well as ensuring opportunities for staff involvement, celebration of success and other means of helping others through the journey of change.

    A discussion on the actual choice of intervention, and information on tried-and-trusted and cutting-edge OD interventions could easily fill a book on its own. In all likelihood, unless the problem is simple and the solution obvious, you may need some input from a professional here. As a leader, it is important to at least be able to understand the principles of OD and be able to be involved in and oversee what happens. If you have followed a good process, you should be able to spot someone trying to sell you their favourite solution or who does not have the expertise and experience to identify the right solution. Also remember that most serious problems are systemic, which means interventions will need to occur and be sustained at many levels.

    Nonetheless, some classic interventions that may be implemented in organisations at various levels include:
    • individual (eg coaching, mentoring, counselling, training, career planning, work/job design, feedback);
    • dyads (eg conflict resolution, role negotiation, coaching);
    • teams/departments (eg team coaching, process revision or work redesign, role negotiation, self-managed teams, quality circles, team-building, education and training, interdependency training, vision setting, and appreciative enquiry);
    • interdepartmental (eg process and task design, survey/intergroup feedback, conflict resolution, partnering, interdependency training);
    • organisational (eg vision setting, survey feedback, strategic planning, appreciative enquiry, future search conferences, culture analysis, total quality management, business process redesign); and
    • inter-organisational (eg partnering, process consultation, conflict resolution, interdependency exercises, information sharing).
    Some of these may ring bells and seem familiar; others might not make much sense. Be aware, as I have raised before, that typical teambuilding that is marketed in South Africa is rarely true teambuilding and is more frequently just rewarding fun (eg quad-biking, drumming, war games), as opposed to true teambuilding which is usually purposeful hard-work.

    Remember that with solutions, every organisation is unique. What works for one organisation, often has no impact for another organisation. So do not pick your interventions because ‘it worked at ABC organisation’. Consider a pilot intervention (where possible) to see if there is a good fit with the organisation. Be bold in asking questions about potential interventions. Study the information carefully before choosing. Lastly, find a balance between trusting your intuition as a leader about what will work and being stubborn or dependent. In Part 4, we will look at how a leader can contribute toward effective and efficient implementation of interventions and successful OD results.

    - Dr Stuart Allen works at the Nyack College, SBL.
    Author(s): 
    Stuart Allen
  • Organisational Development and the NPO leader: Part 2 - The OD Diagnostic Process

    ‘One-size fits all’ solutions are common today. Thousands of self-help and business books published each year make the assumption that ‘what has worked for me will work for you’. Often the solutions touted by supposed ‘gurus’ seem to make sense and even apply to our situations. However, people and organisations continue to have problems – evidence that self-help books are yet to provide the perfect cure.

    Professor Dail Fields’ (Regent University, USA) writing on organisational diagnosis raises the modern occurrence of ‘solutions looking for a problem’. This simply means that we find a tool or idea that sounds great and proceed to implement the idea, which potentially distracts from or avoids the real problem and its causes. Illustratively: if you went to a mechanic and before you could explain your car’s problem they told you they would replace the radiator and everything will be fine, you would be pretty suspicious. However, if the mechanic spent some time test-driving your car, looking under the car and at the engine, and asking you questions about your experience of driving the car, you would be a lot more open to the list of suggested remedies. Organisations are no different - the new ideas, tools, strategies and methods (which often have clever names like ‘3rd-wave dynamics’) suggested by ‘gurus’ for improving some aspect of your organisation rarely address the unique situation, problems and environment of your organisation. What is more often required is a unique solution or an old solution customised in a unique way.

    In Part 1 of this article series, diagnosis was named as the starting point of the organisational development (OD) process. This means isolating problems, figuring out what the causes are and preparing to look for solutions. For the NPO leader, I’d strongly recommend working with your management team, your board, an assembled task team, or all three, in starting the diagnostic process. Usually an OD process is started because of an awareness that ‘things aren’t as they should be’, but even if you are not overtly aware of major problems, you can engage this process as a means to give your organisation a health-check or to identify things that could be improved on.

    Extending the mechanic metaphor, the next step in the process of diagnosis involves looking under the hood of the car to get more information. Now it is very easy for us, as the leader, to assume we know what the problem is, but our own relationships, personality biases and history, position in the organisation, and personal theories about the organisation may blind us from the real problem. Organisations can be like holograms – your position / perspective in an organisation is a major influence on how you understand or interpret a situation or problem. To avoid confusing symptoms and causes, focusing on the wrong problem or cause, as well as a myriad of other OD maladies, we need to follow an objective process that gives us perspective on the situation. Following a logical method helps us avoid these pitfalls. The diagnostic process involves a few steps:

    a) determine your focal areas;
    b) hypothesise about the possible causes of the problems;
    c) gather data; and
    d) analyse the data objectively to see if your hypothesis is supported.

    Determining the focal areas of your diagnostic enquiry is essentially about identifying your key problems. It is like recording a list of a patient’s symptoms and trying to summarise them. Added to this, you should discuss these problems with different stakeholders (eg employees, board etc) to see if there is general agreement about the problems, symptoms and potential causes. This prevents you from falling into the trap of assuming you know what the causes and solutions are, and allows you to discover new and diverse information. The aim in discussing problems with others is to listen and ask questions – not to convince them of your views or theories.

    The next step is to hypothesise on the cause of a particular problem. Now you probably already have a few hypotheses, but the idea is not to simply take a few wild stabs at what you think the issues might be. Rather, there are some well developed guidelines (based upon organisational theory) which help to explain the majority of organisational problems. The challenge is to figure out which one is relevant to a particular situation. Below are some questions that can guide us toward a hypothesis about the causes of a problem:
    • Is it a conflict / tension between management and employees?
    • Are employees’ needs not being met by the employer? (financial and others eg need for achievement or support)
    • Is employees’ work appropriately designed with clear roles, expectations and measurable goals? (although a mechanistic view, a lack of management control can be a cause of problems in organisations)
    • Is the organisation rationally designed (with clear authorities, administrative policies and procedures and required levels of competence at each level) or does the organisation rely purely on the charisma of its managers and leaders? Organisations cannot avoid all bureaucracy as control and freedom need to be balanced
    • Is the organisation structured in a way where it can be responsive to its environment? Rapidly changing environments often require smaller autonomous teams that can quickly make decisions and adapt to needs
    • Is the organisation reliant or dependent on any specific limited resource (eg personnel, funds, expertise, suppliers)? As soon as there is a resource dependency, people in organisations often compete for that resource or fight to reduce their dependence on it
    • Is the organisation excessively institutionalised by its need for legitimacy? Most NPOs need to comply with numerous laws and expectations. The organisation can lose its identity and uniqueness in this context. Is a better balance needed?
    • Beyond the formal hierarchy in the organisation, organisations become a bit like families with their informal webs of relationships. Is the informal organisation aligned with the formal organisation?
    Various other common causes exist. However, the above questions may help you depersonalise your thinking and recognise deeper patterns in the organisation, which often relate to patterns in power, relationships, organisational structure, matching between the organisation’s design and its environment, management effectiveness, culture, and similar systemic issues.

    The next step is to objectively confirm what is hypothesised or suspected by gathering real data and interpreting it. This step may involve interviews, surveys, examination of organisational records, work group observations, or focus groups. In many cases you need someone with technical expertise and objectivity in data collection, to help you collect accurate data and interpret it. The important thing is to let problems and causes emerge from the data, and not impose our favoured theory or explanation.

    What I hope you would have gathered from this short introduction to the OD diagnostic process is the importance of following a logical sequence in identifying a focal problem, exploring a set of probable causes (with less focus on our own personal biases, assumptions and views), gathering data to see if we have the right problem and causes (a bit like a doctor doing blood tests to confirm their initial diagnosis based upon symptoms), and finally making judgements of the data to determine if, on balance of probability, you have isolated problems and causes that need to be worked upon to improve organisational effectiveness. The trick here is that you do not need to be the expert in diagnosis (hire/consult an expert if needed), but rather you need to ensure a proper diagnosis is completed to prevent you and your organisation from being peddled ‘a solution looking for a problem’ or missing the real problem. In Part 3 of this series, I will focus on planning your OD intervention.

    - Dr Stuart Allen works at the Nyack College, SBL.
    Author(s): 
    Stuart Allen
  • Organisational Development and the NPO Leader: Part 1 - What is OD?

    Organisational Development (OD) is the systematic practice of improving an organisation’s effectiveness. Every leader, NPO/NGO or otherwise, would love to see their organisation become more effective. OD is therefore something that all leaders need to understand and be able to get involved in. Putting OD in the domain of only HR people and consultants is a mistake that many organisations have made. There are some OD processes which are more complex, risky or time consuming, which could motivate a leader to look for an OD practitioner, but even in these circumstances, understanding OD, its principles and aims, will ensure that the leader does not get mislead and can maintain oversight of the OD process.

    A lot of people like to label all kinds of practices and processes ‘OD’, for example team building is often seen as OD. Team-building can be a form of OD, but calling team-building OD is like equating town planning to bricklaying. In truth, real OD follows a specific set of guidelines in how it is motivated, planned and executed. The aim of this article will be to help you, the NPO/NGO leader understand what OD is and what should guide its use (Parts 2-4 of this series of articles will explore the practical process of OD in more detail). Organisational effectiveness can mean many things, such as better structures, smoother service delivery, better stakeholder engagement, or a better organisational ‘mood’. One way of understanding organisational effectiveness, which I have borrowed from Edgar Schein (one of the major pioneers of organisational theory and research) is to divide organisational effectiveness into internal integration and external adaption.

    Essentially internal integration covers all matters related to getting the members (or departments/teams) within an organisation working together well. This covers issues such as conflict, communication, alignment of different units, organisational culture, climate, leadership, integration of technology, communication and implementation of strategy, trust, decision-making, change, and a whole lot more. Internal integration is about getting the ‘insides’ of the organisation working well to ensure the organisation can focus on and achieve its mission or purpose.

    External adaption, on the other hand, is all about getting the organisation aligned with its environment. This includes variables like stakeholder relations, aligning the organisation to funders, aligning the organisation to social needs to ensure relevance, compliance to the law and regulations (including employment equity or affirmative action), relationships with other NPO/NGOs, and identifying and developing strategy. Having an organisation that works well, but is poorly aligned to its environment (eg meeting needs that are not key to society or inability to gain funding), typically results in as many problems as an organisation that is well aligned to its environment but has internal integration issues (eg torn apart internally by politics).

    Like people, organisations are never in perfect shape (or at least not for long) before a new challenge comes along and begins to create problems. So do not expect your organisation not to have issues. The key for the leader is to recognise which issues are paramount, in terms of internal integration and external adaptation, and drive those issues as long as necessary or until a greater issue comes along. In general, OD does not refer to short-term, minor interventions (eg painting the office) but focuses on long-term adaptive processes (eg trying to get an organisation to become more responsive to its clients or beneficiaries, or building a stronger, sustainable leadership structure). Such long-term, complex problems may take months and years to overcome. In other words, OD does not follow a ‘problem’ or ‘flavour’ of the month approach, but is usually far more big-picture and strategic in the issues that it focuses on. It is a systematic effort to change the organisation in deeper ways such as with culture, strategy, structure or capacity.

    OD typically follows a cycle of diagnosis, planning and intervention. Diagnosis is the process of identifying what the issues are and what is causing them. Without an understanding of what the issues or problems are, we are unable to prioritise or choose interventions. This is the topic of Part 2 in the article series and will help leaders understand how to go about the process of diagnosing problems. Suffice it to say that we are usually aware of the symptoms (eg clients, funders or employees complaining), but we are not always able to see the underlying problems or their causes.

    Once we have established the problems and their causes, we are in a position to beginning planning interventions and changes to overcome the problems (Part 3 in the series). This stage is all about exploring options, problem solving and thinking through plans to make a change. When actual intervention implementation (Part 4 in the series) begins, it needs to be executed in a systematic and well-thought out manner to ensure that needed changes take root.

    OD is often programmatic, meaning it often involves a series or collection of interventions rather than just one intervention. For example, a large organisation wanting to develop its culture will not achieve this with one intervention (eg a series of workshops on the ‘new’ culture’ over a month), but will more likely require a series of interventions (eg workshops, training, communication campaigns, motivational realignment, updating of rituals and symbols) over a number of months or even years in order to see real improvement. Failure in diagnosis (eg focusing on the wrong problem), planning (eg choosing the wrong intervention) or intervention (eg running the intervention in a disorganised or unprofessional manner), will allow the initial problems to persist.

    Significant changes to an organisation’s effectiveness are rarely achieved by haphazard or accidental interventions or processes. They are also rarely achieved by lone individuals or leaders. Hence, in most organisations an OD programme requires a team of committed individuals (including significant representation from the leadership of the organisation) to guide and oversee OD programmes. In some large organisations this will result in an entire OD department dedicated to this purpose. Regardless of who is doing the work, OD is so important to the organisation that the leader has to be present and committed to aid, guide and oversee the OD process. Leaders should never relegate themselves to the periphery of OD by abdicating the organisation’s whole OD programme to others (eg HR or consultants), and significant involvement (at least in terms of awareness and support) of the board is critical. Equally, leaders may lose perspective of their organisation and problems that occur, and it is even possible that the leader becomes part of the problem. In this case, having an independent and experienced outsider to aid the OD process is critical. Aspects or tasks in the OD process can be delegated, but the overall direction and championing of the OD programme requires a passionate, involved and humble leader.

    I hope what you have seen thus far is that OD is relevant to every organisational leader. Within NPOs, as well as corporate environments, there is little forgiveness for organisational ineffectiveness, and organisations disappear every year. Equally I hope you will see that OD follows a logical and systematic sequence. It is not haphazard and does not rely on (much) guess-work. Rather it is a step-by-step process of identifying problems or needed changes, planning those changes, and implementing the changes (through interventions) in an orderly and thoughtful manner. This should make sense to most committed and experienced leaders who will know that it usually takes persistence and long-term effort to achieve anything of real value.

    Dr Stuart Allen works at the Nyack College, SBL

    Author(s): 
    Stuart Allen
  • Public Servants Still Profit from State Procurement

    A troubling question is increasingly asked about South Africa: At what point does corruption become endemic? When does corruption become so systematised that it becomes almost irreversibly ‘the way business is done’ – the expected norm?

    The hearings on 6 July 2009 before Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) may provide a profoundly disturbing response. If nothing else, the evidence of persistent and widespread failure by government departments to implement reasonably clear ethics standards and procedures suggests there is little comfort from that quarter that our country will not reach this point.

    Lack of capacity to discipline offenders
    SCOPA heard that many government departments still lack the systems and skills to enforce the ethics and disciplinary standards applicable to public servants. Almost a year after an Auditor-General’s report found widespread breaches of the Public Service Code of Conduct in the process of state procurement, a worryingly large number of the public servants identified have faced no disciplinary action.

    Easy escape routes for offenders
    One of the reasons is that officials resign and escape discipline. There is, thereafter, no functioning system to prevent officials finding employment in another government department. Recent research by Idasa found that a blacklist of convicted tender offenders required by the Corrupt Activities Act is not operative as, despite the frequency of reported tender irregularities, there have been no convictions in the five years since the law’s enactment.

    A related gap in the anti-corruption framework – one that shows no sign of being plugged – is the absence of post-employment restrictions. There is no prohibition on public servants leaving the public sector to take up employment in the private sector: a government official is therefore free to join a company to which he shortly beforehand irregularly awarded a government tender contract.
    Code of Conduct ineffective, with low levels of compliance.

    The evidence heard by SCOPA follows a Public Service Commission (PSC) report finding three years ago that the Code is ineffective in preventing especially two related types of unethical and unlawful behaviour by public servants - favouring friends or family, and unauthorised outside remunerative work.
    The PSC report recorded a lack of cooperation by several departments with the Commission’s investigation, which suggests low levels of compliance with the Code. In a number of departments, the Code had never been referenced in disciplinary proceedings.

    “In terms of … conflicts of interest the favouring of friends appears to present the biggest problem,” the PSC concluded. It found that a comprehensive review of the Code is overdue and recommended that it should take account of this factor, as it is ‘vital for building sound integrity systems’.

    The Commission recommended the tightening of the Code, finding that its aspirational and obligatory components cause confusion. It also recommended the introduction of ‘strong penalties if there is non-compliance’. This review has not yet taken place.

    Standards of ethical conduct
    What are the standards of behaviour required of public servants, including those responsible for administering the state’s procurement of goods and services?
    The Public Service Act (103 of 1994) and the Code of Conduct contained in Chapter Two of its Regulations (of 2001, as amended) elaborate on the requirements of section 195 of the Constitution (1996) that public administration must be characterised by a high standard of public ethics, and that public services must be provided impartially and efficiently to the general public benefit. Public servants are obliged to place the public interest first in the execution of their duties.

    These standards are reinforced by the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act (1 of 1999, PFMA) and the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (2004), with particular emphasis on prudential state procurement of goods and services from the private sector.

    For example, Section 17 of the Corrupt Activities Act stipulates that any person employed in the Public Service who, without prior managerial consent, knowingly acquires or holds a private interest in any contract, agreement or investment emanating from or connected with the department, component or office in which he or she is employed, is guilty of an offence.

    The Code declares that it aims to ‘give practical effect’ to the constitutional provisions and to be a ‘guideline’ for public servants’ conduct. Serious breaches constitute misconduct, while dismissal and criminal charges are possible sanctions. Public servants are obliged by the Code to report allegations of fraud and corruption. The PSC’s 2006 report recommended a review of the state’s whistle-blower mechanisms. Despite a review initiated in 2005 under the auspices of the State Law Reform Commission, substantive reforms are still awaited.

    Section 34 of the Corrupt Activities Act also creates a duty on persons holding positions of authority to report corrupt transactions. A failure to report, where a person knows or ought reasonably to have known or suspected, a corrupt transaction, is an offence.

    However, the failure by senior managers to act on information reaching them – even, as SCOPA has heard, from the Auditor-General – apart from being a criminal offence, is calculated to disincline ordinary public servants to take seriously their own duty to report irregularities.

    Conflicts of interest
    Public servants are required to avoid a conflict between their public duties and their private interests. The Code sets a high standard in this regard, stating in clear and obligatory terms that employees must recuse themselves ‘from any official action or decision-making process which may result in improper personal gain, and this should be properly declared by the employee’. Any belief that favouring friends or family, without direct personal benefit, does not fall within this prohibition should be dispelled by reference to the overarching constitutional obligations of impartiality.

    Clear steps are set out in the Code and numerous Treasury regulations to assist government managers to ensure that this high standard is maintained. The regulations require that, where a possible conflict of interest arises in the making of any decision relating to a public servant’s duties, another appropriately designated official should take the decision, if a panel of at least two ‘independent persons’ believe this is necessary. If the relevant manager deviates from the panel’s recommendation, ‘she or he shall record the reasons for the deviation in writing’.

    Treasury regulations specify further that no procurement decision may be taken unless and until every member of the bid committee has signed and lodged a declaration that their impartiality in the particular procurement decision will not be compromised by any private interest.

    Declaration of financial interests
    The identification – and avoidance – of sensitive situations should be assisted by the requirement that public servants, and especially senior managers and anyone involved in procurement, must make an annual declaration of their financial interests. The PSC found that senior managers are the category of public servants most likely to be exposed to the risk of conflicts of interest. Financial interests include shareholdings, directorships or consultancies. In addition, any remunerated outside work requires prior disclosure to and consent from a senior manager.

    Failure to disclose, or willfully misleading disclosure, constitutes misconduct.
    Heads of departments are required to assist the PSC to maintain a register of the financial interests of senior managers, and to keep their own registers of all staff involved in procurement ‘supply chain’ activities.

    The integrity paper-trail should, therefore, exist.

    However, despite ever more detailed regulations from National Treasury over the years, and additional codes of conduct for specific industry sectors, such as construction, the Auditor-General and the PSC continue to report low levels of compliance with these reporting requirements.

    The inevitable consequence of senior managers’ failure to ensure adherence to annual and transactional filing obligations is that red flags are not raised when employees fail to voluntarily recuse themselves from a decision where a conflict of interest is a real possibility.

    The truth may yet emerge, but only after contractual obligations have been incurred, payments made, and it has become prohibitively expensive to recover this unauthorised, and frequently fruitless and wasteful, expenditure.

    Some managers refuse to disclose their interests
    Several investigations by the Public Service Commission and the Auditor-General over past years have identified many of the same problems, with no noticeable improvement in the way the state conducts its business. On the contrary, large numbers of serious breaches continue to be identified, involving payments of large amounts of taxpayers’ money to the businesses of public servants’ (and public representatives’) friends and family.

    In fact, the PSC’s Director-General, Odette Ramsingh, informed the Committee that there is a regression in disclosure and monitoring of conflicts of interest. In some cases, non-compliance had become habitual, with about 10 percent of senior managers actively refusing to disclose their financial interests. No evidence was presented of remedial or disciplinary action.

    Bureaucratic obstacles
    SCOPA heard that two mundane practical problems prevent comprehensive annual disclosure of a particular category of financial interests - outside remunerative activities. Such activities include, but are not necessarily limited to, participation in a company that does business with the state.

    First, rather curiously, it is not certain that directors’ fees constitute outside remuneration. Second, while there is an obligation on public servants to obtain their manager’s prior informed consent for such activities, the current standard form does not explicitly require that these outside activities be disclosed. Despite amendment of the PFMA to require such annual disclosure, the form remains unchanged – apparently awaiting executive (ministerial/cabinet) approval.

    Best-practice standards
    The view was strongly expressed during the hearings that serious consideration should be given to completely outlawing outside remunerative activities by public servants, particularly senior managers. Such a ban would make a significant contribution to simplifying public administration, and to reducing the ethical complexities and suspicion that continue to cloud public life in South Africa.
    Furthermore, at the very least, international best practice would require that all financial interests are placed under independent administration, such as in a ‘blind trust’, where public officials have reduced direct control and influence over the intersection between their public duties and their private interests.

    SCOPA’s firm response
    SCOPA has correctly responded firmly to official responses, indicating ineffectual management may amount to dereliction of duty. The possibility of contempt proceedings was raised, and some members suggested a few resignations would be appropriate, although this option would seem to merely compound the culture of impunity from direct disciplinary action.

    SCOPA has promised that heads of department will be ‘called to account’. Whether this means they will be ‘held accountable’ – responsible – is unclear. Similarly uncertain is whether SCOPA will grasp the nettle and direct that tougher regulations – along the lines suggested above – are urgently introduced.
    Nevertheless, SCOPA has signaled a welcome continuation (albeit uneven) of the more robust approach to Parliamentary oversight since the ANC’s December 2007 Polokwane conference, when Jacob Zuma was elected party leader.

    Promise of Ministerial accountability
    As national President, Jacob Zuma has promised that his ministers will be held to account for their performance. This undertaking should mean, for example, that he will allow SCOPA (and Parliament) to assert its authority and refuse any longer to accept excuses from Ministers’ hand-picked Directors-General. It should also mean that his executive should urgently approve the new declaration of interests form.

    Parliament’s own compliance in question
    But credible oversight by Members of Parliament requires that they should promptly correct their own tardiness in complying with their own disclosure obligations. Not only are many MPs reportedly late in filing their assumption of duty financial interest disclosure forms, but their party leadership in Parliament seems unacceptably unconcerned. If Parliament wishes its standard-bearer committee to be taken seriously, its Members need to convince us, and the public servants who account to them, of their own integrity and leadership.

    Gary Pienaar is the Senior Researcher: Governance and Public Ethics at Idasa.


    Author(s): 
    Gary Pienaar
  • Festus Mogae


  • A Tribute to a True African Leader - Festus Mogae

    In February 2009, during a visit to Mozambique as part of his ‘Champions for an HIV-Free Generation’ Southern African tour, former president of Botswana, Festus Mogae, called out to Africans across the continent to keep on fighting the HIV and AIDS epidemic, and not to give up in their struggle towards an AIDS free society. During a press conference, Mogae pinpointed a few important issues that he feels need to be addressed as a top priority, such as male infidelity and male circumcision, and challenged leaders to start taking the epidemic more seriously. He acknowledged Africa’s recent progress in attempts to address HIV and AIDS, but emphasised that much more work is still required.

    Despite his resignation from the Botswana Presidency in April 2008, following a successful decade as ‘top dog’ of the country, Mogae has continued to make a significant impact on the continent, leaving deep, resounding footprints on the uphill path towards African triumph. For more than 10 years, Mogae has set a critical high standard in leadership, particularly in the field of HIV & AIDS, not only for the African continent, but internationally. Recently named “Africa’s Man of the Year 2008” by Africa Today magazine, and the winner of the Grand Cross of the Légion d'honneur and the 2008 Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, the ex-Botswana President is an inspiration to leaders across the globe, and in fact to us all. At a time when African leadership is rife with corruption and poor governance, this months’ HIV & AIDS newsletter serves as a tribute to a man that can undoubtedly be celebrated as a true African leader.

    A decade of dedication

    Festus Gontebanye Mogae, born on August 21, 1939, studied economics in the United Kingdom, at the University College in Oxford and at the University of Sussex. He then returned to Botswana and very soon found himself working for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and then the Bank of Botswana. In 1992, at the age of 53, Mogae was appointed Vice-President of the Botswana, where he quickly made an enormous impact, and assisted his party (Botswana Democratic Party, BDP), to regain power in 1999. In Mogae's first few months in office, he announced a major programme to improve Botswana's infrastructure, using the country's revenues to build schools, medical facilities, and offices. He served as President for ten years, stepping down in 2008, and succeeded by his vice-President, Lieutenant General Ian Khama. Throughout his political career, and to this day, Mogae has been fully committed to the eradication of poverty, unemployment and HIV & AIDS, which he has pledged to stamp out by 2016.

    Mogae’s decade in power personified good leadership; Botswana rose from strength to strength in a number of areas, including HIV and AIDS. Despite the heavy burden that HIV placed on the country from very early on in the epidemic, strong leadership and dedication made Botswana one of the few African success stories, showing significant progress in its response to the disease. Botswana was the first African country to implement a national AIDS treatment programme, and by 2007 had successfully delivered treatment to more than 90 percent of those in need. The country also made significant strides in the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) and the care of AIDS orphans. During Mogae’s tenure as president, mother-to-child transmission of HIV decreased from 40 percent to four percent. Botswana also became a leader in the expansion of voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) services, with HIV testing in all health care settings being offered as routine since 2004. Mogae also placed a high priority, contrary to the example of many other governments around the world, on providing care and support services to people already living with HIV, in order to ensure their continued contribution to their country, their community and their family.

    As per the country’s constitution, Mogae stepped down from his position as President after the completion of his 10-year term, passing on the responsibility to his vice-President. During his reign, Botswana set a good example for its neighbours, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, who could learn a great deal from Mogae, and the leadership style and politics of his country. Botswana is considered a leader in Southern African politics, and is ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in Africa. In his final State of the Nation address, Mogae described the principles that guided his time in office as “prudent, transparent and honest use of national resources for your benefit”. These are principals of a true leader, which are unfortunately so rare in today’s power-hungry world of politics.

    Stepping down from office, but still up to the task

    Following his resignation, Mogae continued to work passionately towards his vision of an HIV and AIDS free country. He also continued to call out those who posed a threat to progress in this regard. Speaking at the first meeting of the National AIDS Council (NAC) on 30 May 2008, shortly after his resignation, Mogae, also the NAC chairperson, openly criticised organisations, bodies and individuals that claimed to have a cure for HIV and AIDS. He emphasised that such claims have the potential to impact negatively on the country’s attempts to overcome the epidemic, directly effecting treatment adherence for example. During the same meeting, Mogae also announced that he had been asked to chair the Council of Elders, which was established with the aim of approaching governments to assist in HIV and AIDS efforts.

    Eager to expand his efforts further, during the XVII International AIDS Conference in Mexico, on the 5 August 2008, Mogae launched ‘Champions for an HIV-Free Generation’, a group of African leaders calling for their peers to step up efforts to prevent the spread of HIV. The group is partnered with the World Bank, UNAIDS, the World Health Organisation, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and PEPFAR, and aims to put some pressure on politicians whom they believe have not pulled their weight sufficiently in the fight against HIV and AIDS. Mogae stated during the launch that campaign members hope to engage governments in discussions about behavioural change, unsafe sexual practices, stigma and discrimination against women. He also announced that he aims to establish a small technical office in Botswana in an effort to develop HIV and AIDS prevention programs. Following the International AIDS Conference, dignitaries around the world applauded Mogae for his commitment to the HIV and AIDS fight; including Kenneth Kaunda, former Zambian president who hailed Mogae for his extraordinary work in rousing African leaders to come together to tackle HIV head on.

    Mogae has also shown exemplary dedication to women’s issues in Africa, specifically in Botswana. During the month of his resignation, women commended his efforts across the country, and the continent. Speaking the launch of the Women Sector of the National AIDS Council, Chairperson of Botswana National Council on Women (BNCW), Hermetinah Mogami, stated that, “We would like to express our gratitude towards the respect that our leader has showed us during his leadership…There has been, over the years, a surge for gender equality and equity worldwide and we have seen positive changes at home under your governance…The Botswana Government became, during your time, a committed partner by finding equal ground for both men and women in different aspects of the society."

    Superior leadership honoured

    In addition to a long list of awards received during his time as President, which include a Global Market Place Award, an assortment of AIDS leadership awards and the Grand Cross of the Légion d'honneur, Mr Mogae has recently been honoured with two rather significant awards, demonstrating the massive impact he has made on Africa. In October 2008, Mogae was awarded the 2008 Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, and will receive US$ 5 million over a ten-year period, and US$ 200,000 annually for life thereafter. In addition, over the next ten years, the foundation may grant another US$ 200,000 annually to causes of Mr. Mogae’s choice. During the ceremony, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that, "President Mogae's outstanding leadership has ensured Botswana's continued stability and prosperity in the face of an AIDS pandemic which threatened the future of his country and people". According to Dr Peter Piot, “the former President of Botswana has demonstrated what leadership – and perseverance – can achieve in the face of extreme challenges. The Ibrahim Prize represents a pinnacle in Mr Mogae’s efforts to stop the spread of HIV, not only in Botswana but throughout Africa. He is a true visionary and an exemplar to other leaders around the world”.

    Africa Today magazine then named Mr Mogae as ‘Africa’s Man of the Year 2008’, early in 2009. The award, given either to a sitting or immediate past head of state, is aimed at enhancing democracy and good governance, and stimulating sustainable development, regional integration and cooperation. Mogae was chosen from a shortlist of outstanding African personalities. The magazine cited that Mogae came into office at a time when Botswana was threatened by the scourge of HIV and AIDS, but he managed to ensure that the country remained stable and prosperous through the effective management of the country’s mineral resources, and by enforcing strict anti-corruption measures. In addition, Mogae displayed leadership in responding to the HIV and AIDS threat by combating HIV-related stigma and establishing one of Africa’s most comprehensive and progressive programmes for addressing the epidemic. The magazine also noted that the former president continues to be active in the fight against HIV.

    A true African leader

    While there is far more that could be said about the achievements and ambitions of Festus Mogae, a point that must be stressed is that the example that he set from his very first day as President of Botswana, the superior leadership that he displayed throughout his tenure, and the continued commitment that he has shown to important causes such as HIV and AIDS and poverty, must not simply be admired and applauded. These are qualities that should be worked towards by anyone in a position of power. The leaders of this world have the power to make a difference, as has been shown by Mogae. It is simply a matter of priorities and motivation. In the words of Mogae, “One more day of delayed action is a day too late for our people…Our people are crying out for help. Let us respond while there is time”.

    Jonathan Mundell is the Director: HIV & AIDS Unit at Consultancy Africa Intelligence. Write to him at jonathan.mundell@consultancyafrica.com

    The March edition of the HIV & AIDS in Africa Newsletter is republished here with permission from Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI), a South African-based research and strategy firm with a focus on social, health, political, and economic happenings in Africa. For more information see http://www.consultancyafrica.com or http://www.ngopulse.org/press-release/consultancy-africa-intelligence. Alternatively, visit http://www.consultancyafrica.com/promo2 to take advantage of CAI’s free, no obligation, 3-month trial to the company’s Standard Report Series.
  • Civic Education for Political Empowerment 2009

    The Training Centre for Development Cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa (MS-TCDC) is conducting a course on Civic Education for Political Empowerment 2009 from 16-27 November 2009 in Arusha, Tanzania.

    This course is designed for practitioners in development organisations; local government leaders and officials; women and youth community leaders; opinion leaders; and functional adult education community facilitators. By the end of the course, participants will be able to facilitate and manage civic education processes, develop training programmes, and organise activities that help members of the public know and assert their rights, appreciate their responsibility, and adhere to their civic obligations.

    Dates: 16-27 November 2009
    Application Form: click here.

    Registration Fee:
    The fee for the course plus a single room is US $1220; for a shared double it is US $1030. The course fee includes registration, tuition, course materials, transport to and from Kilimanjaro International Airport/Arusha Town and excursions, as well as full boarding and lodging at MS-TCDC and on excursions. MS-TCDC charges a fee for laundry services. MS-TCDC has not included pocket money and other allowances in the course fee.

    For more information, click here.
    Event type: 
    Training
    Event venue: 
    Arusha, Tanzania
    Event start date: 
    16/11/2009
    Event end date: 
    27/11/2009
  • The Roots of the NGO Crisis: A Look Beyond the Surface

    I have been active in the NGO sector in South Africa for about 27 years starting out as volunteer, field worker, organiser, programmes manager and later as director. I have also served on various NGO boards, act as advisor to many and now practice as a development practitioner within the sector.

    During these years of involvement I have tried to develop a sensitive understanding of the challenges that NGO type organisations (or organisations with a social purpose) face. A few years ago I authored a book – The Art of Leadership and Management on the Ground (2006) -that captured those experiences to make it available to a broader audience. The central focus of the book is the role of leadership in building sustainable organisations for permanent social change. The response to this book was overwhelmingly positive and this prompted me to develop questions around leadership and learning within the sector, especially in relation to the current crisis facing NGOs in South Africa.

    Although this crisis is manifesting itself as a funding crisis, lack of resources and lack of capacity, my view is that this is simply the outward manifestation or symptomatic of a deeper crisis – a crisis of leadership. Empirical evidence would suggest that this crisis of leadership does not of course only relate to the NGO sector but to all sectors of society. But my focus with this paper is the NGO sector. I would argue that this leadership crisis is a result of a leadership discontinuity that took place within the sector over a period of about 30 years. My view is that we have experienced a leadership discontinuity further exacerbated by a disruption of learning processes with serious implications for transfer of knowledge, skills, experience and a subtle, sometimes deliberate undermining of a body of knowledge produced in the process of struggle for a true developmental practice in the interest of the poor and marginalised.

    Background to the NGO sector globally and in South Africa


    Within the European context the anti-slavery movement in England in the late 18th century provided the initial impetus for the rise of what we today know as the NGO movement (or non-profit sector). This movement gave rise to various “political associations” that eventually led to the World Anti-Slavery Convention in 1840. Subsequently the World Alliance of Young Men’s Christian Associations (YMCA’s) was founded in 1855, followed by the establishment of International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863.

    Trade unions emerged later in the 19th century as a leading force in the NGO movement. Rapid industrialisation with its consequent social and economic challenges, created specific areas of need within societal structures. It is these needs that the NGO sector tries to address. The growth of the sector has been substantial over the last decade, fuelled by increasing concerns over issues such as the environment, globalisation, unemployment and poverty, human rights violations and more recently the HIV and AIDS pandemic.

    NGOs in Africa and social control

    The emergence of the NGO sector in Africa can be traced back to the period of colonisation and the role of the missionaries in conquest. In a paper, Manji and O’Coill (2002) state that the role of NGOs “…in ‘development’ represents a continuity of the work of their predecessors, missionaries and voluntary organisations that cooperated in Europe’s colonisation and control of Africa.” According to them NGOs can either subscribe to an “emancipatory agenda” or a “paternalistic role” in development.

    Although not stated explicitly, the authors identify at least three major periods within which this colonisation and control evolved. The first was characterised by the colonial period of war and conquest with the missionaries playing a significant role in controlling the expectations and behaviour of black people. Where services were provided by the colonial state it was mainly for a minority. A clutch of charities and missionary groups provided support to the majority rural population such as material support in education, health or other social services. In exchange they evangelised amongst the black population, promoting their own vision of civilisation (Manji and O’Coill (2002).

    Struggles by Africans against colonialism were either met by brute force or the waging of an ideological war. Within the latter the missionaries and voluntary organisations played a key role. “They provided the (colonial) administration not only with a cheap form of private welfare, but with a subtle means of controlling the behaviour of blacks.” The programmes of care which they delivered did not seek to address the root causes of the poverty but focused on the failings of Africans themselves. “The problem was not injustice, but being ‘uncivilised’ and suffering from the ‘native’ condition,” Manji and O’Coill (2002).

    The post independence or second period landed these missionary and charitable groups in a crisis since the popular political movements derived their legitimacy and credibility from a desire to end social injustice. Manji and O’Coill raise an important point about how these missionary and charitable groups managed to survive after independence and found the answer in the changing discourse around ‘development’.

    “While the idea and practice of ‘community development’ existed within the colonial period, voluntary bodies did not represent themselves or their work in terms of ‘development’ until much later when the US Government and the international agencies began to distinguish half the world as ‘underdeveloped’ and to describe ‘development’ as a universal goal” Manji and O’Coill (2002).

    Since the missionary and charitable groups were tainted by their association with a racist past, the new discourse around ‘development’ created a way out for their dilemma of illegitimacy. By adopting this mantra of ‘development’ they could create a connection with emancipation. They also started to express concern about poverty and vociferously condemned the racial prejudice that created this poverty. They reinvented themselves as indigenous ‘development NGOs’ due to the pressure of black resistance and international politics (Manji and O’Coill (2002).

    It is important to note that the discourse around ‘development’ was quite different to how progressive NGOs with an emancipatory agenda would interpret and understand it. The dominant discourse was framed “with a vocabulary of charity, technical expertise, neutrality, and a deep paternalism.” It “…continued to define non-Western people in terms of their perceived divergence from the cultural standards of the West, and it reproduced the social hierarchies that had prevailed between both groups under colonialism” Manji and O’Coill (2002).

    According to Kaplan (1996) even in the so called ‘developed’ Western countries there were “damning and articulate indictments” of this notion of ‘development’. Quoting well renowned economist Wolgang Sachs and colleagues, Kaplan (1996:10) writes:

    “The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape…the development epoch is crumbling under the weight of delusion, disappointment, failure and crime, and …the time is right to write its obituary.”

    After political independence the new African rulers were not so eager to extend the benefits of political office to everyone. The popular movements, associations and trade unions that brought these rulers to power were now seen as an obstacle to progress. Under the guise of ‘national planning’ they were marginalised and replaced by experts supported by bureaucratic and centralised decision-making. The language of emancipation and denial of rights was now replaced with the language of ‘poverty’ and ‘basic needs’. The difference may seem trite, but the implications are huge for developmental practice. As Manji and O’Coill (2003:7) state, the first approach,

    “…demanded popular mobilisation, the other inspired pity and preoccupations about the technically ‘correct’ approaches to ‘poverty alleviation’.” (my emphasis)

    During this time we also saw the emergence of development economists, advisors, technicians and ‘experts’. As a rule they were all imported from the West.

    Another development took place, namely the role of the local development practitioner or activist. The political orientation changed from being concerned about power relations that generate poverty to poverty being the problem of the poor. According to this outlook poverty can be eradicated by the ‘development’ practitioner teaching the poor how to help themselves, hence the notion of ‘self-reliance’. The Freirian understanding of a lack of power being central in maintaining the position of the poor was undermined and with it the role of the activist as one of conscientising the poor to their own inherent power to change their own circumstances (Kaplan, 1996:38-39).

    The 1970s saw major political and economic upheaval. The world economy experienced a recession. An oil crisis created a financial glut with Europe and America awash with capital and little prospect of high rates of return. Developing countries were offered loans to finance ‘development’. But this glut of international credit was short lived and the cost of borrowing increased significantly in the 1980s fuelled by an American monetary policy that drove up interest around the world. Those countries that took loans were suddenly faced with huge debts and the challenge to service the interest on the loans. It was during this period that we saw the advent of globalisation and its twin brother, neo-liberalism. Technological innovations also provided further impetus for this new form of economic and political control (Manji and O’Coill, 2003).

    As a political ideology neo-liberalism believes in the supremacy of the market and the safeguarding of the right of a minority to the unfettered accumulation of profits at the highest rate possible. This is euphemistically referred to as ‘growth’. They argue that when this freedom to accumulate is unrestricted others will reap the benefits through a ‘trickle down effect’. According to this mantra, the purpose of ‘development’ is therefore to guarantee this ‘growth’ so that other freedoms can be enjoyed at a later stage in the future. State expenditure should be directed to create an enabling environment for this ‘growth’ to take place and not be ‘wasted’ on providing public services that can be best provided for by private enterprise (Manji and O’Coill, 2003).

    The imposition of structural adjustment programmes as part of the debt provisions by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank led to a growth in poverty and inequality. The result was popular dissatisfaction and demonstrations. These demonstrations were violently suppressed, and the most popular organisations became the target of repressive laws. Universities were closed and strikes were declared illegal. This widespread opposition forced the multilateral and bilateral aid agencies to reconsider their approach to promoting ‘development’. Neo-liberalism at this stage had to be dressed up with a more “human face”. According to Manji and O’Coill (2003:9) the outcome of this process was,

    “…the ‘good governance’ agenda of the 1990’s and the decision to co-opt the NGOs and other civil society organisations to a repackaged programme of welfare provision, a social initiative that could be more accurately described as a programme of social control.”

    It is important to note that many NGOs unwittingly allowed themselves to be co-opted to this agenda by being hoodwinked by the language of ‘good governance’. Manji and O’Coill stressed that the pre-condition for NGOs’ cooption to this neo-liberal cause was merely a “coincidence in ideologies rather than a deliberate plan.” (my emphasis) Instead of coercive means to uphold an unjust social order, the proponents of neo-liberalism saw an opportunity to perpetuate this order through consensual means. Unlike the colonial missionaries who were not as discreet in justifying an unjust social order, the modern day NGOs may have unwittingly allowed themselves to be co-opted to perform this same role, albeit in total ignorance with more devastating effect (Manji and O’Coill, 2003:12).

    To summarise one can delineate the 3 periods of social and economic control namely:
    1. The colonial period (war, conquest, missionaries and charitable organisations spreading the language of ‘civilisation’)
    2. The neo-colonial period (the development of indigenous ‘development’ NGOs as they adapted to the new political forces)
    3. Period of globalisation and neo-liberalism (adopting the language of ‘good governance’ with NGOs co-opted mostly unwittingly to assist in social control)

    Interestingly, a similar process was (and is still) pursued in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall and the penetration of Western capital to capture the potential emergent markets with the ‘development NGOs’ in the forefront of this economic conquest. This is how Kaplan (2005:14) summed this situation up in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    “In the past, BiH (Bosnia-Herzegovina) was dictated to by various (foreign) empires and regimes. These have disappeared; but ‘globalisation’ and the dictates of unaccountable global institutions might signal greater danger. With the latter, power is wielded in more hidden and insidious ways, through temptation, through assumption, through a compelling discourse which lulls to sleep rather than awakens.”(my emphasis)

    The evolution of the South African NGO sector

    It is within the context of the global developments and discourses in the ‘development’ industry, especially the broader African context, that one must view the South African NGO sector as a community of practice to understand the current impasse. The same patterns can be delineated.

    Although one can trace the origin of the South African NGO back to the slave period, for the purpose of this study I will start with the period of the 1970s when the more modern NGO emerged as we know it today. The pre-1970 period was characterised mostly by predominantly white controlled welfare organisations subsidised by the apartheid government promoting separate development.

    The period preceding the 1970s was marked by political repression with the major political actors banned, imprisoned or forced into exile. The trade union movement, South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), as one of the biggest NGOs in the 1950s was dealt a similar fate.

    The modern NGO sector, also termed the “struggle sector” (as opposed to the state supported and white dominated welfare sector) in its evolution can be contextualised by dividing it into three historical periods.

    First Period: 1973 – 1991

    South Africa experienced enormous economic growth in the 1960s. However, in 1978 the country experienced a deepening recession that resulted in its worst economic crisis. The fall of colonial regimes in Mozambique and Angola developed a renewed confidence amongst local activists to confront the apartheid state. This confidence was fuelled by one of the biggest strike waves since the second world-war in 1973 in Durban that spread to major centres in South Africa until 1978. Out of this strike wave was born a new trade union movement, later baptised as the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU).

    In 1976 the country was rocked by the biggest rebellion of high school students against the forced imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. This period also saw the emergence of the Black People’s Convention (BPC) with its ideology of black consciousness and focus on fostering self-reliance through its programmes in black townships. Many adherents of the BC tradition were inspired by the works of Paulo Freire, Frantz Fanon and Afro-Americans like Carmichael. The emergence of the BPC was a forerunner of the more modern struggle NGO post 1970 (Matiwana and Walters, 1986).

    It was during this period that NGOs mobilised against the apartheid state with some NGOs acting as front organisations for banned political parties. Various struggles were waged during this time such as consumer boycotts, school boycotts, worker strikes such as Fattis and Monis the boycott of the Tri-cameral parliament. Out of these struggles emerged alliances of organisations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the National Forum (with the Cape Action League as an affiliate based in Cape Town) (Matiwana and Walters, 1986:33).

    During this period South Africa experienced deepening crises manifested in various political uprisings in 1980, 1985 and 1989. The military strangulation and subsequent retreat of the South African Defence Force in Angola with the help of the Cuban forces led to the independence of Namibia and later a negotiated settlement in South Africa.

    Many NGO leaders had an activist background with affiliation to a certain political tendency. It was during this time that NGOs were flooded with external funding with very little or no concern for accountability from donors. Funding during this period came mainly from church based sources or international donors who entered the NGO scene during this time.

    Most of the knowledge, experiences and skills were acquired through incidental learning, action learning, observation, modelling, self-directed learning through study groups, reading, etc. Many of those who were part of the leadership had to hit the ground running. Learning happened in the process and practice of struggle. There was very little time for formal learning or training courses. What existed were non-formal leadership courses organised mainly by church groups. Examples of this were the Christian Education Leadership Training (CELT), Methodist Christian Leadership Centre and the Churches Urban Planning Commission (CUPC) (Matiwana and Walters, 1986:43). During this time the sector was also male dominated.

    Second Period: 1992-1999

    During this period political parties were unbanned and a new political climate prevailed. NGOs started to revaluate their role vis-à-vis the state and many leaders left the sector in droves to join the new democratic government that was elected by popular vote in 1994. The UDF was dissolved and a deliberate process of demobilisation of organisations was embarked upon. This had the effect of reducing the oppressed to spectators to the political negotiations that followed. The political compromise that followed happened with almost no input and participation from popular organisations. This was in stark contrast to their previous role in the struggle years where consultation and participatory democracy was cherished and embedded in the process of struggle.

    A new economic regime - the Growth Economic and Redistribution Policy (GEAR) was put in place that replaced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This was to be South Africa’s version of the structural adjustment programme imposed on other African countries in the second period as outlined above. This was neo-liberalism in disguise. The protagonists of this self-imposed structural adjustment programme often frowned upon and stifled debate around ideological underpinnings and implications. NGOs were not very vociferous in their opposition to this policy, too scared that they may be targeted and denied funding.

    A more hostile donor environment started to prevail with more emphasis now on accountability, transparency, management, good governance, legal compliance, measuring impact and project planning. Available funding could only be accessed with strict conditions especially around planning and reporting. The logical framework planning method imported from the USA (from the Pentagon) via Germany (ZOPP method) became prominent with many leaders sent for training to master this tool (Reeler, 2008:5). The social theory that underpinned this method was hardly questioned openly.

    Many NGOs collapsed unable to adapt to the new conditions. International funding dried up as more donors decided to exit. Local funding sources opened up to mitigate the effects of the limited international donor funds and more international governments preferred to enter into bilateral funding agreements (government to government) such as USAID and the European Union. Local funding sources were (and are still) marred by bureaucratic red tape and inefficiency. NGOs were now encouraged to develop ‘income generating’ strategies to mitigate the effects of a developing funding crisis. Already the very identity of the NGO sector as ‘non-profit’ started to shift, albeit under the guise of ‘income generation’. The discourse around NGO ‘sustainability’ as innocuous as it may sound can be viewed in this context.

    To meet the challenges many NGOs started to network and established forums. The South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) was a product of this networking amongst NGOs. Donors also promoted such networks to save on administrative expenses in the management of funding contracts. One example was the Urban Sector Network (USN), consisting of a group of NGOs promoting social housing.

    A new policy framework for NGOs was developed with the most important being the Non-profit Organisation (NPO) Act. This NPO Act required all NGOs to register themselves. This was to be a prerequisite for external funding and to compel NGOs to legally comply with certain provisions such as submission of annual narrative and financial reports to promote accountability.

    On the education and training front new policies were introduced by the democratic government with a new emphasis on formal training, accreditation of courses, the establishment of SETAS, Recognition of Prior Learning, South African Qualifications Authority and National Qualifications Framework. Many formal educational institutions eg universities, started to position themselves to offer training programmes to address the new demand for ‘capacity building’. A new terrain and language opened up and new training programmes were required and offered. Many NGO leaders enrolled into these programmes to improve their own social mobility and at times as a stepping stone into government or the corporate sector. Unlike the first period where the focus was on the collective, a crass individualism and materialism started to emerge at a leadership level. Interestingly at this time the role of the development practitioner or activist started to assume a new meaning, from activist in the Freirian understanding to one of development worker teaching the poor to help themselves, ie the discourse of ‘self-reliance’. Popular mobilisation to address strategic issues of power was replaced with the discourse of ‘capacity building’ and ‘advocacy’ all imported from the ‘developed’ (read: overdeveloped world). The discourse of the second period in the African context started to play out.

    At the same time new NGOs and CBOs focusing on the new challenges such as HIV and AIDS, women and child abuse, gender mainstreaming, etc started to emerge. A new cohort of leaders entered the sector, at times unaware of the lessons of the previous period. Social movements with a more overt political agenda started to gain more prominence as the social and economic crisis deepened with ‘service delivery’ protests becoming more sustained and spreading. The rise of the social movements can be linked to the failure of the NGO sector to address strategic issues of power at this stage.

    Third Period: 2000 – 2007

    During this period another cohort of leaders emerged who entered the NGO sector having either left the corporate sector or state institutions. Others were unemployed and started NGOs as a survival strategy. Some of the leaders in the second period migrated to government or having achieved formal qualifications, started their own businesses or became consultants to the sector.

    During this time more international ‘development NGOs’ started to enter the country competing for space with local NGOs. The policy frameworks of the state were now largely in place with a seeming change in attitude towards the sector. NGOs were suddenly viewed as ‘service delivery agents’, ie an extension and appendix to state designed (welfare) programmes. Problems on the ground were now framed as a ‘lack of implementation’ and not problems with the fundamental design and the development discourse that underpinned that design. As if the thinking behind GEAR could be artificially separated from these state designed (welfare) programmes!

    Meanwhile the funding crisis deepened with a myriad of NGOs collapsing, many of them staffed by highly experienced and professional people. Frustrations with state subsidised donor agencies also spilled over into anger and despondency amongst many NGOs. SANGOCO lost credibility and as a network organisation all but collapsed.

    This period also saw the consolidation of social movements with a more overt political agenda such as the Anti-Eviction Campaign, Landless People’s Movement, Anti-Privatisation Front, etc. This coincided with sustained ‘service delivery’ protests around the country and a general disillusionment with deepening poverty. Joblessness increased with an almost total collapse of public health and education and a deepening housing crisis (ie privatisation by default). This is reinforced by a conscious state policy of “self-disconnection” ie allowing the poor to disconnect themselves from basic services such as water provision, electricity and communication. At the same time the ‘connected’ are involved in widespread corruption and looting in the public and corporate sector.

    The SETAS, launched with much fanfare to address the skills shortages in the country also started to show signs of incapacity and an inability to deliver on their mandate. Calls for their closure increased but later a scaling down was agreed upon.

    On the political front divisions within the ruling ANC party deepened, culminating in a change of leadership at its Polokwane conference in December 2007. The policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was challenged since as benefitting only a few black elite with ties to the ruling party. Calls to rescind this policy increased with other voices calling for a more broad based approach. Meanwhile statistical reports (Sunday Times, Business Section, 20 November 2005) confirmed the widening gap between rich and poor with South Africa being the most unequal country in the world after Brazil. This deepening social and economic crisis and its effects on the poor finally spilt over into the xenophobic attacks in early 2008. The crisis for the NGO sector deepened with some big NGOs closing down. According to research quoted by the University of Stellenbosch only two percent of NGOs would remain sustainable in the long term (Cited by USB, Mail & Guardian, 5 May 2007).

    In a recent gathering of about 20 NGO leaders who can be regarded as veterans within the sector, all having entered the sector in the first period, the precarious situation that the sector finds itself in today was summed up in this way (Kaplan et al, 2008:5):

    “We are losing our humanity. As NGOs we are losing the practice of being human – and this was (their emphasis) our practice. Why, and how may we rekindle it? What are we enabling, what are we allowing? We don’t talk truth anymore; and truth exposes, truth names the void – says what is really there. But we cannot speak because we no longer listen; we no longer listen to the silenced voice, the silenced person, the silenced position, the silenced idea.”

    Towards the end of 2007 calls were made for the revival of SANGOCO nationally, with various chapters re-launched in the middle of 2008. All over the country some NGOs started to do some serious introspection with leadership networks emerging in Johannesburg (NGO CEO Circle), Durban (Leadership Conversations) and Cape Town (The Leadership Circle and Director’s Forum). Deep disillusionment has been expressed during these gatherings with the current impasse that NGOs have reached and blamed mainly on the political leadership. In the gathering of NGO leaders quoted above this disillusionment was expressed thus:

    “Our political leadership, and the movement that overcame apartheid, appear bitterly tainted with the ravages of pride: corruption, disrespect, arrogance, and overwhelming culture of denial. Our financiers and merchants – peppered now with erstwhile struggle leadership – have joined a mass movement of global capital and argue the fate of our (their) money as the arbiter of the fate of our land…and the gap between wealth and poverty has become obscene” (Kaplan et al, 2008:5).

    This then, is the context within which the NGO sector finds itself in today and the realities that the leadership are confronted with.

    A typology of the three periods may look like this:
    1st Period
    Political and economic crisis in SA; focus on activism; trade unions rebuilding; building of democratic organisations; UDF and National Forum launched to coordinate local struggles; fighting apartheid state; SA isolation deepens; war in Angola a turning point; learning in action; informal learning, experiential learning; learning as participation in struggle; ample funding available; little accountability for NGOs; struggle sector vs state subsidised welfare sector; male dominated; the ‘development discourse’ enters SA; leadership training offered by churches; a strong indigenous NGO movement become entrenched.

    2nd Period
    Political compromise; new democratic government; new policy frameworks; GEAR strategy adopted by government to promote ‘growth’; RDP scrapped; popular democratic organisations demobilised; ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘basic needs’ discourse emerged; uncertainty amongst NGOs; networks emerged, foreign funding dries up; local funding sources open up; focus on ‘income generation’, leadership exodus to government; new leadership enters sector; crisis in the NGO sector emerging; new language of ‘good governance’ and accountability; new tools to measure development work (e.g. logframe imported from Germany via USA); NGOs collapsing; new NGOs emerged focusing on HIV/Aids, women & child abuse; new educational regime i.e. accreditation; RPL, etc.

    3rd Period
    Deepening social and economic crisis exacerbated by global crisis; service delivery protests increased and becomes sustained; social movements gain more prominence; xenophobic attacks become more widespread; deepening divisions in ruling party; crisis for NGO sector deepens, more NGOs closing down; leadership networks emerged; questioning of political direction and political leadership; revival of SANGOCO; NGOs regrouping; a new generation of leaders enter the sector; female leadership dominance disillusionment within the NGO sector; calls for revival of UDF; more international ‘development’ NGOs enter SA competing for space with local NGOs; symptoms of a global economic crisis emerge; split in the ruling party formalised a year later.

    Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Political and economic crisis in SA; focus on activism; trade unions rebuilding; building of democratic organisations; UDF and National Forum launched to coordinate local struggles; fighting apartheid state; SA isolation deepens; war in Angola a turning point; learning in action; informal learning, experiential learning; learning as participation in struggle; ample funding available; little accountability for NGOs; struggle sector vs state subsidised welfare sector; male dominated; the ‘development discourse’ enters SA; leadership training offered by churches; a strong indigenous NGO movement become entrenched

    Political compromise; new democratic government; new policy frameworks; GEAR strategy adopted by government to promote ‘growth’; RDP scrapped; popular democratic organisations demobilised; ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘basic needs’ discourse emerged; uncertainty amongst NGOs; networks emerged, foreign funding dries up; local funding sources open up; focus on ‘income generation’, leadership exodus to government; new leadership enters sector; crisis in the NGO sector emerging; new language of ‘good governance’ and accountability; new tools to measure development work (e.g. logframe imported from Germany via USA); NGOs collapsing; new NGOs emerged focusing on HIV/Aids, women & child abuse; new educational regime i.e. accreditation; RPL, etc.

    Deepening social and economic crisis exacerbated by global crisis; service delivery protests increased and becomes sustained; social movements gain more prominence; xenophobic attacks become more widespread; deepening divisions in ruling party; crisis for NGO sector deepens, more NGOs closing down; leadership networks emerged; questioning of political direction and political leadership; revival of SANGOCO; NGOs regrouping; a new generation of leaders enter the sector; female leadership dominance disillusionment within the NGO sector; calls for revival of UDF; more international ‘development’ NGOs enter SA competing for space with local NGOs; symptoms of a global economic crisis emerge; split in the ruling party formalised  a year later

     

    Political and economic crisis in SA; focus on activism; trade unions rebuilding; building of democratic organisations; UDF and National Forum launched to coordinate local struggles; fighting apartheid state; SA isolation deepens; war in Angola a turning point; learning in action; informal learning, experiential learning; learning as participation in struggle; ample funding available; little accountability for NGOs; struggle sector vs state subsidised welfare sector; male dominated; the ‘development discourse’ enters SA; leadership training offered by churches; a strong indigenous NGO movement become entrenched

    Political compromise; new democratic government; new policy frameworks; GEAR strategy adopted by government to promote ‘growth’; RDP scrapped; popular democratic organisations demobilised; ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘basic needs’ discourse emerged; uncertainty amongst NGOs; networks emerged, foreign funding dries up; local funding sources open up; focus on ‘income generation’, leadership exodus to government; new leadership enters sector; crisis in the NGO sector emerging; new language of ‘good governance’ and accountability; new tools to measure development work (e.g. logframe imported from Germany via USA); NGOs collapsing; new NGOs emerged focusing on HIV/Aids, women & child abuse; new educational regime i.e. accreditation; RPL, etc.

    Deepening social and economic crisis exacerbated by global crisis; service delivery protests increased and becomes sustained; social movements gain more prominence; xenophobic attacks become more widespread; deepening divisions in ruling party; crisis for NGO sector deepens, more NGOs closing down; leadership networks emerged; questioning of political direction and political leadership; revival of SANGOCO; NGOs regrouping; a new generation of leaders enter the sector; female leadership dominance disillusionment within the NGO sector; calls for revival of UDF; more international ‘development’ NGOs enter SA competing for space with local NGOs; symptoms of a global economic crisis emerge; split in the ruling party formalised  a year later


    In summary:
    The above typology can lead to the misconception that the movement of leaders in and out of the sector happened in a mechanistic manner. This is wrong. It is quite common to find leaders (although rare) who joined the sector in the mid 80’ and leaders who joined the sector in the mid 90s and who are still active. The purpose of this typology is to show that there are three distinct periods that can be identified with the movement of leaders in and out of the sector in each period and facing different qualitative challenges that impacted on the continuity of leadership with implications for transfer of knowledge, skills and experiences.

    What emerges from the above typology is the unfolding of a process of subtle social and economic control that happened in the rest of the continent during the second and third period as outlined above. South African NGOs did not remain impervious to the discourse around ‘development’, ‘good governance’, ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘basic needs’ that NGOs beyond our borders were exposed to, with some unwittingly (and at times understandably) adopting this mantra and its unspoken agenda. The ‘development’ discourse was uncritically embraced especially since its protagonists were vociferous in their opposition to apartheid. Following this, the discourse around ‘poverty alleviation’, ‘basic needs’ and ‘good governance’ were also embraced since that was what NGOs thought they were struggling for in the first period (in SA) and also because it coincided with our democratic practices and ethos forged at that time. Many leaders were not aware that these discourses were already common currency globally nor were they aware of the real agenda of social control behind them due to South Africa’s relative isolation from the rest of the world. However, its effects were as devastating in South Africa as can be seen in the second and third periods in SA, as in the rest of Africa as Manji and O’Coill have pointed out above.

    At the same gathering of veteran NGO leaders quoted above, this confusion about how the NGO sector as a community of practice has evolved was captured in the following observation:

    “The development industry has usurped our very language. All the old words, concepts, no longer work. Yet language influences and defines who we are. At this point of transition we can no longer say what we mean. We ourselves no longer know what we mean…None of this is unique to SA, we’re all part of a global framing…” (Kaplan et al, 2008:7).

    After analysing the situation they found themselves in the veteran leaders admitted:

    “Looking at ourselves truthfully we were able to admit that we were both flattered and used by international donors who regarded South African NGOs as special, with superior expertise to bring to the dark continent. Glorying in this role we allowed ourselves to become separated from others on the continent.” (Kaplan et al, 2008:24).

    Conclusion


    In this paper I have tried to show that the roots of the current NGO crisis can be located in the shifts in leadership that have occurred within the three historical periods as outlined above. These shifts were accompanied by broader shifts in the power relations in South Africa post 1994 and the witting or unwitting cooption of sections of the leadership to a discourse that was detrimental to the interest of the poor and marginalised. It was an agenda of social control masked by a language of ‘development’ and ‘good governance’ that coincided with the language of struggle.

    The entry of new leadership generations in the second and third period into the sector facilitated this cooption. It was further reinforced by the disruption of informal learning processes and by depoliticising the sector through the undermining of a body of knowledge, experience and skills acquired in the process of struggle to promote a developmental practice in the interest of the poor and marginalised. The shift in emphasis to more formal learning processes and with their emphasis on accreditation, standardisation and commodification of education at the expense of the value of informal learning, should be viewed in this context.

    I would argue therefore that what was transferred (content) as part of leadership development in the SA NGO sector cannot be divorced from how (methodologies/form) it was transferred. A clear shift took place from the informal learning approaches in the first period dominated by activism to more formal approaches to learning in the second and third periods dominated by discourse of ‘development’ and ‘good governance’ with a new dominant trend amongst the leadership towards materialism and individualism.

    The largely technicist and strictly academic approach (advanced mainly by academics with no or little experience of true development) embedded in the formal learning approaches, either deliberately or by default bought into the dominant global paradigm of ‘development’, ‘ capacity building’, ‘good governance’, ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘basic needs’.

    An NGO leader working with abused women put it this way:

    “When the lecturers explain something I can hear they lack experience. Experience comes from the heart and theory comes from the head. I can assess if they have personal experience or clinical experience, paper knowledge.”

    Another NGO leader described it like this:

    “We hear of development studies… especially if we look at the South African context…training programmes are based on imported views that have no bearing on the context in which we live.”

    Dr Linda Cooper identified a similar trend in the labour movement where she contrasts a focus on ‘workplace training’ from previously ‘workplace education’ with its emphasis on formal certification, recognition of prior learning and accreditation within a national qualifications framework. According to her (1998:10), worker experience previously regarded as shared resource and

    “…guide to action’ amongst workers has been turned into a commodity which is ‘individually ‘owned’ “and can be exchanged for a qualification in order to compete with other workers on the capitalist labour market, and in a struggle for individual upward mobility and ‘career paths’.”

    The logic of profit accumulation and maximisation had penetrated the South Africa NGO sector in insidious ways and its discourse became dominant albeit in sometimes disguised and deceptive forms. The very identity of the sector as “non-profit” has become contested terrain.

    As Paul Goodman (1964:61) stated in relation to formal education, “Profit societies, like garrison states, invade every detail of life.”

    As this paper has demonstrated, the NGO sector in South Africa, as is the case in the rest of the world, has not been impervious to this invasion. The question is: for how long will we blame external funding or lack of capacity for the crisis in which we find ourselves in? Or are we prepared to look beyond the surface, beyond the obvious? Only time will tell…

    References


    Cooper L (1998) “’From rolling mass action’ to ‘RPL’: The changing discourse of experience and learning in the South African labour movement’.
    Goodman P (1964) Compulsory Miseducation, Penguin Education, New York
    Julie F (2006) The Art of Leadership and Management on the Ground: A Practical Guide for Leaders and Managers to Build Sustainable Organizations for Permanent Social Change, Cape Town: Creda Communications, Cape Town.
    Kaplan et al (2008) Boundaries, Possibilities and Constraints amongst NGOs in South Africa, The Story of In-depth Conversation, p. 5
    Kaplan A (2005) Engaging with Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Narrative Account.
    Kaplan A (1996) The Development Practitioners Handbook, London: Pluto Press.
    Manji and O’Coill (2002) ‘The Missionary Position: NGOs and Development in Africa’, in International Affairs, 78(3).
    Matiwana M and Walters S (1986) The Struggle for Democracy, A study of Community Organisations in Greater Cape Town from the 1960s to 1985, Cape Town.
    Reeler D (2008) A Theory of Social Change and Implications for Practice, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Community Development Resource Association.

    Frank Julie is an organisational development practitioner and consultant. He has been involved in development work for the past 27 years. He is the co-founder of the Leadership Circle, a group of highly experienced NPO leaders and donor sharing resources within the sector. Write to him at frankjulie@telkomsa.net. Julie is also the author of The Art of Leadership and Management on the Ground (A practical guide for leaders and managers on how to build sustainable organisations for permanent social change). He is also the author of numerous articles such as ’18 Ideas to Avoid a Funding Crisis’, ’23 Sins of Management’ and ’13 Habits of Highly Effective Leaders’. His new book Leadership and Effective Learning will be published later in the year. He regularly contributes articles to websites and journals all over the world.
    Author(s): 
    Frank Julie
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